I think it is necessary to say a little more on one of the points raised by Tony Blair’s speech, which I mentioned and linked to previously. One of the points Blair noted was the possibility of the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In effect, the idea of such a convergence is the idea that warfighting capabilities that were previously the domain of nation-states are approaching the domain of individuals or small groups. This is not a new event in history. The closest parallel that I can call to mind is the development of the English longbow and gunpowder, and their rivalry of the sword as chosen weapons of war.
Maintaining a swordsman – or a mounted knight – was not a cheap affair. There is a reason that the European feudal system was arranged in such a way as to support the knights of the day — it took the work of a lot of peasants to generate enough wealth to provide for one knight. In other words, serious warfighting power was reserved to relatively large groups of people.
With the development of firearms and the longbow, this ceased to be the case. (I ask the forgiveness of any students of military history — I know that I am drastically simplifying the development of these weapons, but I am trying to make a point about the core effect they had.) With these weapons, serious warfighting power was made available to much smaller groups of people and even to individuals. Two of the societies that confronted this change – Europe and Japan – dealt with the problem in very different ways. Europe embraced firearms, and feudal society gradually collapsed as its rationale for being was removed. Japan, one of the few nations in history to voluntarily reject new technology, gradually eliminated all firearms from the islands, put the manufacturers of firearms out of business, and remained a nation of feudal swordsmen.
The Japanese decision to preserve their society rather than face the consequences of new technology cost them greatly when the gates to Japan were thrown open by Admiral Perry and a fleet of cannon-armed warships. Lacking any effective means to use against these warships, Japan’s isolationist foreign policy was literally ended at gunpoint.
The Japanese example suggests that avoiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may be a mistake. To truly prevent the spread of these weapons, public research into diseases, immunology, toxicology, and nuclear physics may need to be sharply curtailed. Certainly nuclear power will not be allowed to spread beyond a few heavily-guarded plants. The long-term costs of abandoning these avenues of inquiry are incalculable. How are we supposed to cure disease if investigations into the the spread of disease may aid the construction of biological weapons?
The other example, that of Europe, hardly has better consequences. If the nation-state ceases to be an effective method of collective defense – an unlikely, but possible, result of increasing WMD proliferation – who knows what turns society may take. At the very least, the concept of a nation will be weakened, if not destroyed outright. The widespread advent of firearms destroyed the fiefdom — will the widespread advent of WMDs destroy the state?
Beyond mere societal consequences, the nature of the weapons we are dealing with makes passive acceptance of widespread proliferation an untenable position. An intelligent crackpot armed with a rifle can kill dozens, the same crackpot armed with smallpox can kill thousands. With biological and chemical weapons especially, the cost of a weapon of mass destruction is not influenced by materials, but by technology and expertise. History shows that prices based on technology and expertise rather than raw materials and labor tend to decline rapidly. (If you don’t believe me, consider the falling price/power ration of the computer.)
What is the solution? If we suppress those things which are needed for the manufacture of WMDs, we risk crippling science, and thus society. However, if we don’t suppress these materials and pieces of information, we risk either radically disrupting or possibly destroying society. This is not a minor dilemma we face.
The long-term solution undoubtably lies somewhere in the middle ground between two extremes. Although some technological progress will surely be made that can limit the impact of WMDs, our long-term goal must be the construction of a world where, although weapons of mass destruction are available, they are not used. Bear in mind, however, that MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction, for those who are not students of the Cold War) is useless against lunatics, and that even one use of WMDs may constitute an unacceptable loss. The process of creating such a world may begin with the removal of dictatorships such as that of Saddam Hussein, but it cannot stop with mere removal. It will be necessary to stabilize many troubled regions of the world — Palestine and the Middle East, Kashmir, the Koreas, the Balkans, Africa. Providing the details and methodology of this stabilization is left as a trivial exercise for the reader.